THE UNBEARABLE BURDEN OF LEVINASIAN ETHICS by Jay Rajiva
I n 1983, describing his earlier work in Total-ity and Inﬁnity on the ethical notion of the
face, Emmanuel Levinas asserts that he
was once able to write that the face is for an I
– that the face is for me – at once the tempta-
tion to kill and the “Thou shalt not kill”
which already accuses it, suspects me, and
forbids it, but already claims me and
demands me. (Entre Nous 186)
Reiterating his present ethical commitment
to the “[s]ignifyingness of the face,” which
reminds the subject of personal responsibility
“by the face that summons it” (ibid.), Levinas
embeds ethical responsibility in an expression:
“All men are responsible for one another, and
‘I more than anyone else’” (107). The self,
then, is always responsible for the other,
defying symmetrical relations, because every
“I” is paradoxically more responsible than
every other “I.”
While Levinas invokes justice as a check on a
potentially limitless duty to the other, justice
as a limit derives from love and falters in tota-
litarian states in which “the interpersonal
relationship” of love is absent (105). This invo-
cation creates a problem that Levinas has
trouble resolving. A totalitarian state suspends
the justice that constitutes the check on ethical
responsibility, thereby annulling the condition
of the face’s emergence. Conversely, a non-
totalitarian state couples justice to “the
defense of the other” (ibid.) but never comes
to grips with why we should carry the burden
of obligation and responsibility continuously
for all others, if justice, as the limiting third
party, is a legitimate way of redressing the
wrongdoings of citizens. What, then, is the
ethical practicability of the face? This question
arises from the exclusion of a crucial tempor-
ality: a situation in which justice is not the
third party that limits and frames the subject’s
responsibility but rather an active participant
in the subject’s oppression. This subject, a sur-
vivor of physical violence, would face sub-
sequent epistemic violence in the modality of
the face, with its insistence on asymmetrical
obligation and tacit invitation to passivity.
Additionally, the subject might well refuse to
accept a model of ethics as persecution – that
is, as a persistent, impinging presence that
runs the risk of erasing the difference
between perpetrators of violence and survivors
of violence in daily life. This subject has no dis-
cursive space within the Levinasian ethic. It
therefore becomes imperative to interrogate
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THE UNBEARABLE
BURDEN OF
LEVINASIAN ETHICS
the terms by which the face comes into being as
a universal principle.
In this article, I argue that the relationship of
the Levinasian subject to the face and the
beloved creates an unbearable burden of bound-
less responsibility for all others, a responsibility
that is unsustainable as an applied ethical prin-
ciple for survivors of violence, particularly sur-
vivors in areas where ongoing physical and
psychic trauma is a daily reality. Levinas’s treat-
ment of persecution as the inaugural basis of
ethical responsibility tacitly relies on the
ethical subject’s availability for seduction
through an invitation to profane the beloved
that is the obverse of the face. Using Jean
Laplanche’s psychoanalytic conception of the
enigmatic signiﬁer, I interpret the face–
beloved dyad as a pathological response to the
primary, overwhelming, and persecutory
demand of the breast on the infant. Further-
more, I suggest that Levinas refuses to acknowl-
edge what precedes the anxiety of the enigmatic
signiﬁer – the encounter with spacing and tem-
porality that announces the subject into the
world. This refusal problematizes Levinas’s
ethical framework as an applied principle for
subjects whose material speciﬁcity in space
and time cannot be reduced simply to the atem-
poral abstraction of the face. Finally, I challenge
the viability of an ethical model that relies on a
Judeo-Christian notion of non-reciprocity,
which forces survivors of violence into an unten-
able subject position, thereby reifying their con-
tinued erasure as ethical subjects.
seduction, persecution, profanation
One of the most contentious aspects of Levinas’s
ethical imperative is the idea that the target of
violence is, to some degree, responsible for the
crimes of the perpetrators, evidenced in his
declaration that the subject is “responsible for
the other even when he or she commits
crimes, even when others commit crimes”
(Entre Nous 107). We should not, as Judith
Butler notes, take this to mean that “I can
trace the acts of persecution I have suffered to
deeds I have performed, that it therefore
follows that I have brought persecution on
myself” (85). Levinas is not arguing that the
condition of one’s suffering is directly or even
indirectly the result of one’s own actions.
Instead, Levinas notes that “to a certain extent
(may God keep me from being reduced to it as
a rule of daily usage) I am responsible for the
other even when he bothers me, even when he
persecutes me” (Entre Nous 106). Here,
Levinas is able to invoke the principle of respon-
sibility through persecution without taking
leave of the distinction between principle and
“daily usage” that would “reduce” the individ-
ual to continuous undifferentiated guilt,
almost to non-subjectivity. I ask the reader to
defer this seemingly off-hand remark concern-
ing “daily usage” for later consideration. At
the moment I am interested in investigating
how the passivity (the unwillingness, the help-
lessness, the persecution) of this ethical relation
might have its foundation in seduction.
When Levinas implicates the self in the
crimes of others, he gestures towards a web of
ethical relations that precedes and introduces
any sense of oneself:
[P]ersecution is what happens without the
warrant of any deed of my own. And it
returns us not to our acts and choices but
to the region of existence that is radically
unwilled, the primary, inaugurating impinge-
ment on me by the Other, one that happens
to me, paradoxically, in advance of my for-
mation as a “me” or, rather, as the instru-
ment of that ﬁrst formation of myself in the
accusative case. (Butler 85)
Unwillingness is inextricable from lived
experience, but also from the ethical experi-
ence within life. There is a passivity to the
Levinasian formulation as Butler reads it, a
sense in which I receive a call which I can
neither ignore nor refuse; it is something
“that happens to me,” or rather, to what will
come to be “me” through the affective charge
of the call. The disclosure of responsibility sim-
ultaneously begins and ends in the space of a
moment whose temporality I can never know
or quantify. As a result of this call, I am
always already implicated in the totality of all
suffering. Under threat of persecution, one
must passively wait, and it is here that we
the burden of levinasian ethics
136
encounter the ﬁgure of the beloved (l’Aimeé) in
the earlier Levinas of Totality and Inﬁnity.
Despite the lapse in time, there is a persistent
connection between the beloved, whose vulner-
ability inaugurates the ethical subject by
offering an injunction against the very violence
one wants to inﬂict, and the face, the absolute
exteriority of the other whose agonized
staging of suffering produces the inexorable
call to ethical responsibility.
The beloved personiﬁes the “original
phenomena of immodesty and profanation”
(Levinas, Totality 257), not merely inert
matter but the denuding of the body and the
evacuation of any traces of agency, calendrical
time, reason, subjectivity (through duty) and
intentionality:
The Beloved, at once graspable but intact in
her nudity, beyond object and face and thus
beyond the existent, abides in virginity.
The feminine essentially violable and inviol-
able, the “Eternal Feminine,” is the virgin
or an incessant recommencement of virgi-
nity, the untouchable in the very contact of
voluptuosity, future in the present [… ]
Alongside of the night as anonymous rustling
of the there is extends the night of the erotic
[… ], simultaneously uncovered by Eros and
refusing Eros – another way of saying: profa-
nation. (258)
Endlessly available for violation, the beloved
has neither agency nor the discursive possibility
of agency, since she is always “dying without
murder” (ibid.), perpetually reincarnated
before the masculine gaze. Through exposure
and refusal, she both deﬁnes and deﬁes profana-
tion; as Derrida notes in his critique of the
beloved-ﬁgure, the subject “can indeed violate
her but only to run aground before her inviol-
ability” (Touching 86). The beloved incorpor-
ates future into present, outside of space and
time. Immune to temporal violations that only
ever touch a part of her, she withdraws to an
inaccessible future of bodily integrity. Virginity
is both an abiding state, because the beloved is
“the virgin,” and the inﬁnity of a process of
“recommencement” of virginity. Atemporal,
encoding nothing of the past, she bears no
trace of ethical record, and refutes the
conceptual intelligibility of violation. Each
descriptor, each state, announces its opposite:
violable–inviolable, touchable–untouchable,
modesty “in the guise of immodesty,” each pre-
paring the way for the subject’s “profanation-
discovery” of the Beloved, the “shame” of
which causes the subject to avert his gaze from
the “uncovered” (Levinas, Totality 260). Dis-
covery is coextensive with violation, but not in
secret. The discovery of modesty in oneself
announces the immodesty of the naked
beloved, the presence of voluptuosity, “which
does not come to gratify desire; it is this
desire itself” (259–60). Levinas slips in
“shame” and “audacity” through the analytical
screen: the subject reacts to the perception of
the beloved because he has already subscribed,
in advance of perception, to the concept that
the denuded feminine is a priori immodest
when beheld.
Profanation, therefore, depends upon the
subject’s complicity in a framework that nego-
tiates the exposure of the beloved – of nudity
– to the stranger who sees what he believes he
is not meant to see. Beholding the feminine is
a violation that does not trigger disgrace (a
need to keep secret) or any signiﬁcation of the
beloved as a willed subject:
Here lies the very lasciviousness of erotic
nudity [… ] beyond the decency of words,
as the absence of all seriousness, of all possi-
bility for speech [… ] The beloved, returned
to the stage of infancy without responsibility
– this coquettish head, this youth, this pure
life “a bit silly” – has quit her status as a
person. (263)
The beloved regresses to infancy, abdicates
her selfhood, below the bar of speech, “serious-
ness,” and reason, reifying “an implacable con-
ﬁguration” of “femininity, infancy, animality,
and irresponsibility” (Derrida, Touching 87).
Supposedly atemporal, beyond past and
future, the beloved “has quit her status as a
person,” but such an exit from personhood
demands a prior state of being from which she
emerges to become pure exteriority. Who
assists, permits, and demands such an emer-
gence? The beloved’s exile from temporality
rajiva
137
eclipses the subject’s pronouncement of exile
and erasure of the act of pronouncement.
In Levinasian thought, then, the beloved
comes into being through the conﬂation of
beyond-signiﬁcation with the feminine as
object of desire. Through this conﬂation, the
infant quietly becomes the ward of the mascu-
line speaking subject, positioning the irrever-
ence of silence as the obverse of speech-as-
signiﬁcation; Levinas presents this conﬂation
without attempting to justify the rhetorical
moves that permit his concept of the beloved
to function. The cumulative weight of tethering
gendered language to the terms of atemporality
thus obscures an earlier discursive stage, in
which the feminine is excluded from signiﬁca-
tion. This exclusion gives us reason to distrust
the process by which the face comes into
being, since its validity as an ethical trope
arises from the beloved as beyond signiﬁcation.
With signiﬁcation emptied from the register,
we are left with the simultaneity of the face
shining through the “wantonness” of the
beloved. Again, Levinas rejects temporality,
asserting that “[t]he non-signifyingness of
erotic nudity does not precede the signifying-
ness of the face as the obscurity of formless
matter precedes the artist’s forms”; instead, he
locates revelation in the “wanton,” whose
ethical inertness paradoxically indicates the
“frankness” of the face (Totality 261). Discov-
ery is, without explanation, not a violation but
rather the revelation of a facial “frankness”
that will hereafter become the ultimate injunc-
tion to murder. This discovery supersedes or
negates sequential time, since for Levinas “[i]t
is necessary that the face have been apperceived
for nudity to be able to acquire the non-signify-
ingness of the lustful” (262; emphasis added).
Without linearity, we have a conception of
time that borders on messianic, with the partici-
pants in this scene – subject and face/beloved –
dramatizing a return to ethics that has actually
never ceased to be eternal, even during the
“time” of the possibility of violating the
beloved. Furthermore, the face, in its manifes-
tation of the ethical principle, is also nude,
“not resplendent as a form clothing a content,
as an image, but as the nudity of the principle,
behind which there is nothing further” (ibid.).
The move from denuded beloved to denuded
face introduces temporality, only to foreclose
it, as if the philosophical principle is reluctant
to dwell in the vanishing seconds of a moment
that is about to become unavailable for further
scrutiny.
Levinas’s own philosophy, in sum, evacuates
the conscious subject of self-reﬂexivity1 at pre-
cisely the moment when self-reﬂexivity is
necessary to interrogate the terms and tropes
of this ethical “scene.” We are thus left with a
series of paradoxes: discovery of the beloved is
a violation that does not violate; discovery of
the beloved occurs outside sequential time,
anticipating and following the face; and discov-
ery introduces the dialectic of two nudities,
“absolutely heterogeneous, and one being the
reverse of the other, yet both and each announ-
cing the one through the other and the one
beyond the other” (Derrida, Touching 89).
How do I discover a thing without reference to
time, when there must be a state prior to discov-
ery that indicates time’s progression? The terms
of each paradox strip the act of discovery of tem-
poral signiﬁcation, eliminating incremental time
in a space where the ethical might still be in ﬂux.
This temporal elimination prevents me, as an
embodied subject constrained by a speciﬁc set
of political and social factors, from challenging
how and why a principle of endless, universal
responsibility comes to compel me to act. If I
receive an ethical call that announces both my
responsibility and my agency, such a call
emerges within a gendered set of tropes whose
apparent timelessness effaces gendering as a dis-
cursive move, with its own particular matrix of
implications and exclusions.
As the “inversion of the face in femininity”
(Levinas, Totality 262), the beloved is the
staging-ground for ethical responsibility only
insofar as her vulnerability permits the subject
to explore the limits of his agency. One
beholds the face, becoming alive to the suffering
of the other, at the moment one rejects the invi-
tation to profane the passive beloved:
[T]he relation to the Face is both the relation
to the absolutely weak – to what is absolutely
the burden of levinasian ethics
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exposed, what is bare and destitute, the
relation with bareness and consequently
with what is alone and can undergo the
supreme isolation we call death – and there
is, consequently, in the Face of the Other
always the death of the Other and thus, in
some way, an incitement to murder, the
temptation to go to the extreme, to comple-
tely neglect the other – and at the same
time (and this is the paradoxical thing) the
Face is also the “Thou Shalt Not Kill.”
(Entre Nous 104)
By 1982, when “Philosophy, Justice, and
Love” (from which the above passage is taken)
ﬁrst appears, Levinas no longer mentions the
beloved by name, yet the word hovers in the
margins of the description of “what is absolutely
exposed, what is bare and destitute,” which cor-
responds to an isolation2 that eventually precipi-
tates death. In this very isolation, one is
supposed to hear the call of “Thou Shalt Not
Kill.” But why should one respect the call
instead of succumbing to the seduction of profa-
nation? We can hardly fail to notice the provoca-
tive quality of the language that (is and)
surrounds the issue. We witness the erotic in
its nudity, hinting at a forbidden secret, lasci-
vious, eternally feminine, the virgin to be vio-
lated, coquettish, “already laughter and
raillery” (Totality 260), using the tenderness
of the caress to signal voluptuosity which
“begins already in erotic desire and remains
desire at each instant” (259). Discursively,
Levinas tethers the feminine to an almost porno-
graphic scene of seduction; we are suffocated by
the gendered language of seduction, and of vio-
lation (persecution) embedded in seduction. At
the site of the beloved seducing the masculine
subject we can sense Levinas, in his turn,
attempting to seduce the (masculine) reader.3
But through seduction emerges the face, and
tautologically, all ethical responsibility,
because “only the face in its morality is
exterior” (262). Exteriority becomes the realm
of ethical signiﬁcation from which the beloved
is constitutively banished.
Rejecting psychoanalysis, Levinas wants to
retain the concept of the feminine as otherness
to negotiate the problem of desire, which “is
philosophical and concerns otherness” (Entre
Nous 113), but this rejection is merely a discur-
sive foreclosure, another tautology. If Levinas is
so insistent on expropriating this idea of the
feminine from psychoanalysis it is only
because his philosophy cannot accept the exist-
ence of a developmental stage in which “the ‘I’
ﬁnds itself disarmed and passive in its relation
to the message from the other” (Butler 76). Cor-
respondingly, the face only coalesces in what
Butler characterizes as “an idealized dyadic
structure of social life” (91), sidestepping the
question of why the atemporal feminine is
retained in the deﬁning ethical encounter with
the face. Why do we speak of the obverse of
the ethical face as “she,” and why is “she” not
situated in a given space, proceeding through
any kind of sequential time? Why does
Levinas move so swiftly and so polemically
from the excruciatingly gendered language of
seduction (the excessive affect of desire) to the
tacitly masculine austerity of the face, whose
exteriority in suffering becomes the supreme
ethical call, the unbearable burden of responsi-
bility? This move betrays a compulsion in the
subject, an anxiety to escape an earlier engage-
ment or originary persecution and seduction
that psychoanalysis could interrogate. In the fol-
lowing section I set the terms of this engage-
ment by placing the subject, persecuted
through seduction, in a very speciﬁc location:
at the mother’s breast.
the face at the breast
If the unrelieved interiority of the Levinasian
beloved evokes a sense of ﬂight from a more
primal scene that Levinas cannot acknowledge,
Jean Laplanche’s theory of the enigmatic signif-
ier, “the residue of a primary situation of being
overwhelmed that precedes the formation of the
unconscious and the drives” (Butler 71), returns
us to this scene to ground the ethical imperative
in a developmental narrative of subject for-
mation. Butler writes that “for Laplanche it
would seem that the primary experience for
the infant is invariably that of being over-
whelmed, not only ‘helpless’ by virtue of unde-
veloped motor capacities, but profoundly
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clueless about the impingements of the adult
world” (70–71). This “clueless” state ﬁnds its
most profound signiﬁcation in the adult desire
that confronts the infant, who, lacking language
or even reﬁned cognition, cannot understand
what this other person wants of him or her.
To ﬁll the role of this other person, Laplanche
uses the mother primarily, but in a slippage
which I will subsequently show is not as acciden-
tal as it seems, also posits his indifference to the
speciﬁc ﬁgure of this scene, asserting that “there
is no reason to assume that these caregivers
must be oedipally organized as ‘father’ and
‘mother’” (70).
The infant is overwhelmed by the other’s
desire, which is only intelligible in a linguistic
and social order into which he has not yet
been inaugurated. Laplanche crystallizes the
infantile feeling of being overwhelmed in the
following question:
Can analytic theory afford to go on neglecting
the extent to which women unconsciously and
sexually cathect the breast, which appears to
be a natural organ for lactation? [… ] It is
impossible to imagine that the infant does
not suspect that this cathexis is the source of
a nagging question: what does the breast
want from me, apart from wanting to suckle
me, and, come to that why does it want to
suckle me? (Qtd in Santner 34)
The sexual cathecting of the breast in adult
women conﬂates the lactating organ with sexual
pleasure, impinging on the infant with a series
of demands framed as questions. How can I
make sense of what this other person or thing
desires, and why am I the unwilling target of
this desire? Why am I helpless? Why does she
have control? Why am I forced into a relation
with this breast? Why does she ﬁnd pleasure in
the act? And how do I constitute a part of that
pleasure? A crucial part of Laplanche’s argument
is that the infant can never resolve these ques-
tions, which are “imposed upon the child from
this environment and [which] produce over-
whelming and unmasterable primary
impressions for which no ready adaptation is
possible” (Butler 71). The process of repressing
these impressions becomes the drive, passing
this alien code of desire and sexuality into the
world of the symbolic, where the introjective
“attack” of repressed “enigmatic signiﬁers”
goes on to shape adult sexuality (73). We
cannot fail to note the profound sense of persecu-
tion in the description of primal childhood
trauma, of the subject violated by alien hands,
breasts, and desires, at a speciﬁc moment in
time when he is unable to speak or act in
response. However, converging with Levinas,
we encounter the opacity of feminine desire,
which precipitates a complication of Laplanche’s
seemingly innocuous lack of concern for who
exactly ﬁlls the role of the caregiver.
Via the interpretive work of John Fletcher,
Butler tracks Laplanche’s theory as an alterna-
tive model to the Lacanian symbolic, noting
that Laplanche’s “recourse to the ‘adult world’
as the source of sexual messages is a signiﬁcant
departure from psychoanalytic accounts that
assume an Oedipal scene with Mother and
Father structuring desire at a primary level”
(142). Of profound interest, though, is how
the Oedipal model becomes the method of ban-
ishing all speciﬁc discussion of why female
desire is impenetrable even in psychoanalytic
and ethical models that rather too vehemently
profess to dispense with the Oedipal scene as
such.4 Though Laplanche does not appear to
care who the caregiver is (insofar as this care-
giver is an adult who impinges on the infant,
nothing else really matters), his most speciﬁc
and memorable example of the enigmatic signif-
ier is the breast-feeding woman whose sexual
cathecting of her breast initiates an unmaster-
able process in the child that will quietly begin
to contaminate his drives, later resulting in the
adult’s sexual self-alienation. It is the mother
who brings about this self-alienation, the
woman bare-breasted, exposed, and immodest
in her nudity. Ostensibly concerned with chal-
lenging the primacy of Lacanian psychoanalysis,
and equally critical of Levinas for the latter’s
failure to “decenter adult experience” (Butler
76), Laplanche tacitly reintroduces the female
as the source of an originary psychic trauma,5
just as Levinas slips feminine desire into the
foundation of his ethical model through the
ﬁgure of the beloved.
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In Laplanche’s formulation, we witness the
female other exposed, but active in her desire,
which threatens to overwhelm the infant.
However, unlike the Levinasian subject encoun-
tering the beloved, the stranger here is not a
stranger in the proper sense, but the child of
the mother: stranger to the symbolic order
from which the mother’s desire springs, but inti-
mately familiar with and to the mother, soon to
be scandalously familiar with the breast itself,
and, correspondingly, with the mother’s desire.
This is the scene from which the Levinasian
subject retreats, against which he will later
invert the relations of power: he must regain
control, profane her in full awareness of his pro-
fanation, and give her over to “passivity, an
already animal or infantile anonymity, already
entirely in death” (Levinas, Totality 259). In
the ethical moment he acts as he was not able
to act when confronted with the enigmatic signif-
ier of the mother’s breast, the seductive persecu-
tion of the mother’s desire.
To the extent that the beloved is the inversion
of the infant’s helplessness before the alien
desire of the mother, it is also the ominous har-
binger of a certain response to that desire, which
is to “deny the unconscious, recenter the
subject, and so make the adult in question
more vulnerable to acting out sadistic impulses
that it refuses to understand as its own constitu-
tive potential” (Butler 77). The chasm that
Levinas asks us to negotiate – between the
urge to profane the beloved and the absolute
prohibition against violence of the face – may
well be unbridgeable; it may be all too easy to
stop short of the face, substituting brutality in
“this violence inviting the profanation, in this
violence of profanation itself” (Derrida, Touch-
ing 88). Seduction, as the repressed residue of
persecution, returns to undermine the ethical
terrain of the face by reinserting itself into the
realm of the ethical:
[W]hat if the “profanation,” the “beyond the
face” (of which Levinas so often recalls that it
already presupposes the face) already per-
tained to the ethical, at the point
where one “beyond the possible” stays at a
tangent to the other, one in contact with the
other, in what remains, as an impossibility,
the same impossible? And the same
“desire”? (91)
For Derrida, profanation of the beloved is not
prior to or other than the ethical principle, but is
rather already implicated in the ethical, driven by
an identical desire. The very act of positioning
profanation as the dialectic of the face (presup-
posing and presupposed by the face, unavailable
to the ethical register) has profound conse-
quences for ethics itself: deﬁning femininity as
pure otherness (in a sense the other of the
other, since the beloved is the obverse of the
face which is already other to myself) necessarily
involves an ethical eradication.
Levinas convulsively pushes the inaugural
ethical moment of the subject beyond the femi-
nine to cover the traces of a foundational
trauma, a push that is not the commencement
of ethics but rather a retreat from an “uncanny
vitality – this ‘too much’ of pressure – as well
as the urge to put an end to it” (Santner 37).
This vitality is not necessarily restricted to the
violence of profanation that I may choose
instead of the ethical imperative of the face; it
also manifests in adherence to the face as an
ethical standard, to Dostoyevsky’s principle
that “all men are responsible for one another,
and ‘I more than anyone else’” (Levinas, Entre
Nous 107). Based on an unending series of
ethical obligations, the Levinasian ethic obliter-
ates the magnitude of individual ethical encoun-
ters through an unwavering commitment to
responsibility at all times, to all people, regard-
less of who they may happen to be, or what
crimes they or I have committed. In my very
adoption of the ethical standard of the face I
may well convert the sadistic impulse to
profane the beloved into a kind of masochism,
a self-scourging for crimes that will remain irre-
parable (because unspeciﬁed), but for which I
am nonetheless, like Dostoyevsky’s characters,
always already responsible. On the subject of
the beloved as a formulation, Derrida offers a
key insight: “There is – let us use a word that
is not Levinas’s – a perversion here” (Touching
88). The choice of the word “perversion,” alien
to Levinas’s discursive register, identiﬁes the
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face–beloved dyad as a pathology that compul-
sively subordinates the speciﬁcity of individual
acts to an impossible standard. Though Levinas
is quick to invoke justice as the third, he never
traces the limit at which we can invoke justice
without forsaking ethical obligations, an omis-
sion that is all the more troubling given his
unmistakable concern for coming to terms with
the extreme violence of the Holocaust. What
are the parameters by which a survivor of vio-
lence makes sense of guilt and responsibility to
all, every day, and that person more than
anyone else?
spacing, temporality, and the
responsibility of the survivor
If we categorize Levinas’s ethics as the concern
for establishing interpersonal relations that do
not oppress, victimize, or violate the participants,
it is troubling that the encounter with the face
takes place in an atemporal context, without
reference to material spaces and prior to beings
who exist in the world, leaving us with no clear
idea of the distance between ourselves and the
others we encounter. I know, if nothing else,
that I am close enough to the face to perceive
the agony of the face: the other’s performance
of the suffering in which I discern my ethical
responsibility. But what is the nature of that dis-
tance? Do we speak only of physical distance in a
concrete encounter? Does that distance allow us
to speak, in turn, of distance as an ethical
measure? Physical and psychological proximity
are at risk of becoming indistinguishable in this
equation. The encounter employs a bodily
trope, the face, to visualize an encounter that
implies an ethical sequence (the urge to violate
the beloved, subsequently recognizing the
ethical in the face) without acknowledging this
sequence as a temporal operation. Time folds
back in on itself, collapsing forms of distance
and thereby erasing the possibility of challenging
the universality of the ethical scene. There is a
discrepancy between the universality of the face
to which Levinas asks us to subscribe and the
speciﬁcity of location that betrays itself in the
very metaphor of the face: a metonymy for the
body that suffers, the face must, in order to
retain relevance as a trope, reject the universality
of a discourse that asks me to hold myself respon-
sible for everyone else, at all times, whether they
are out of sight, earshot, or touch. Otherwise, the
ethical abstraction of the face would dissolve into
unintelligibility, a trope shorn of the sensory
context that makes it intelligible as a trope. No
longer an ethical move, the face would then
signal a withdrawal into abstraction before the
enigmatic signiﬁer of the breast, making it vir-
tually impossible to distinguish my ethical
responsibility in speciﬁc moments from the tota-
lizing and pathological guilt that the face, by deﬁ-
nition, compels me to feel. However, Levinas
disavows the importance of exactly where the
subject is situated in relation to the beloved/
face.6 Why? I argue here that the importance of
spacing and temporality signals a radical destabi-
lization of the foundation of Levinas’s argument,
casting us back to something more embodied
than the face (at the breast) – the mouth that
screams before it speaks.
Writing on the philosophy of touch, Derrida
and Jean-Luc Nancy both agree that the opening
of the mouth signals the formation of the
subject: one screams, or opens the mouth to
emit a sound, and in so doing one forms the
spacing with one’s lips before nourishment or
speech. At issue is the mouth as spacing as
well as space: the lips, the cavernous interior
of the mouth, certainly, but also the spacing
that precedes the scream, the paradox of the
bounded nothing, the signifying absence pre-
ceding the sound:
The mouth is at the same time place and non-
place, it is the locus of a dis-location, the
gaping place of the “quasi permixtio”
between soul and body, which is to say the
incommensurable extension between them
and common to both, since the mouth –
any mouth, before any orality – opens an
opening. (Derrida, Touching 28–29)
Phenomenologically speaking, the mouth is
originary, before breast, beloved, and face,
metonymizing the incommensurability of soul
and body in the gap that is also spacing. When
Nancy translates the “quasi permixtio” of Des-
cartes’s Sixth Meditation as “comme un seul
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tout [like a single whole]” (132; translation
mine), he announces the “embouchure of the
mouth, originary spacing of a mouth opening
(itself) between the lips and at the other’s
breasts” (Derrida, Touching 28). Forever
after, the ego
makes or makes itself exteriority, spacing of
places, distancing and strangeness that
make up place, and thus space itself, ﬁrst spa-
tiality of the tracings of a veritable outline in
which – as in no other – ego may come forth,
trace itself out, and think itself. (Nancy qtd
in Derrida, Touching 27)
The ego’s gift of exteriority is itself an aware-
ness of the unsettling quality of speciﬁc places,
and thus of all space. Through the mouth, the
ego forms by disclosing spacing as the subject’s
existential foundation.
Temporality – living in a given space,
through ungraspable moments of time – is the
ineluctable consequence of being born,
without which there is no basis for ethical
relations, because there is no life. Characterizing
the mother as the “noun and name Nancy never
pronounces,” Derrida connects the spacing
between the lips of the mouth to the opening
of childbirth, noting that “this happens before
any ﬁgure – not before any identiﬁcation, but
before any ‘identiﬁcation with a face’” (Touch-
ing 28). Temporality is what the mouth voca-
lizes through a spacing that forms its ego,
before face or beloved. Consequently, the
concept of an atemporal beloved is a retreat
from the phenomenality of ethical relations,
analogous to what Luce Irigaray describes as
the retreat from ethically attentive perception
into atemporal sensation:
At that point, perception is supplanted by
sensation [… ] [B]ut it is still passive,
artiﬁcial, and outside the constitution of
a temporality which does not involve
the exercise of one’s power over the other.
(Irigaray 45)
Irigaray notes the passivity of the sensual
(sensation), but rightly rejects the Levinasian
compulsion to map the sensual (beloved) onto
an absolutely feminine interiority that invites
the brutal exercise of power, because for her,
“[o]ne way of being is not enough to constitute
an identity” (35). Here, Irigaray traces the
beginning of a more recuperative ideology,
acknowledging that, in order to sidestep the
“impossibility” of the gap between self and
other, “men have created an absolute which is
inaccessible, which is completely other with
respect to [women]” (43). Obverse to the face,
the beloved sublates ethical responsibility to
the Same, not only by constructing the feminine
as seductive otherness, thereby consigning it to
“a blindspot in their minds” (45) but also by
erasing the discursive traces of the corporeal
foundation, the lived and embodied experiences
that might complicate the task of engaging in an
ethical relation with the other. In a sense, the
ethic of the face is the denial of the unpresent-
ability, in the living world, of death, “the absol-
ute signiﬁed, the sealing off of sense” which
deﬁes mourning7 (Nancy qtd in Derrida, Touch-
ing 52).
We can now return to a telling moment in
“Philosophy, Justice, and Love” that ﬁnds
Levinas trying to foreclose a tendency towards
ethical rigidity, based on what at ﬁrst appears
to be nothing more innocuous than common
sense: “[T]o a certain extent (may God keep
me from being reduced to it as a rule of daily
usage) I am responsible for the other even
when he bothers me, even when he persecutes
me” (Entre Nous 106). Levinas’s failure (or
inability) to elaborate on what precisely pre-
vents us “from being reduced to” endless
responsibility “as a rule of daily usage” (ibid.)
enframes ethics as a relational task rather than
an atemporal principle – ethics as a sustainable
model of intersubjective engagement. But what
holds me back from endless responsibility, and,
furthermore, what if that “I” is a survivor of vio-
lence, a Holocaust survivor or a Palestinian
whose daily reality would not suffer the indig-
nity of even a single usage of the Levinasian
principle? Levinas wants to ward off the difﬁcul-
ties of practical application with an ad hoc defer-
ral, but the “accusative inauguration of the moi
– the ‘me’” (Butler 85) cannot quietly recede
into the speculative conﬁnes of a “may God
keep me from” because its very facticity
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underlines the casual ease by which such a reces-
sion is effectuated by someone who does not
suffer. Levinas calls for a passivity that is the
passivity of death to the survivor of collective
violence, for whom death becomes a real possi-
bility precisely by virtue of physical and
ethical passivity, an inability to act, an accep-
tance of impinging calls of all sorts, from the
state, from other individuals, from the daily
encounter with structural trauma. The survivor
of such a temporal speciﬁcity, caught in a zone
of extreme violence and suffering, cannot
embrace the impingement of passivity; the
embrace would be deathly, destroying as (and
because) it silenced.
Accepting the passivity of an ethical call
repeatedly, through sequential time, transforms
the suffering of the moment into sustained
trauma for this particular subject. The other’s
death, in this example, illuminates the expec-
tation of non-reciprocity that Levinas explicitly
positions as the cornerstone of his theoretical
framework, the “asymmetry of intersubjectivity”
and “the exceptional situation of the I” (Entre
Nous 105). In this ethical calculus, what I give
and what I receive are not and never equal,
despite the mitigating presence of justice,
which for Levinas is the arbiter of responsibility.
But while justice as a concept works adequately
to describe the legal process of accountability,
it nonetheless consigns the Palestinian refugee
to non-presence outside justice, within the
prison of the “asymmetry of intersubjectivity”
(ibid.): she, and anyone in her subject position,
are excluded in toto. Attentiveness to justice as
a check on responsibility also presupposes juridi-
cal legality as the enforcement of just laws, a pre-
sumption that is intelligible only to a privileged
subject in a privileged time and place. We
cannot, then, escape the problematic of non-reci-
procity as an applied ethical principle: an ethics
of asymmetry only mirrors the survivor’s
trauma, which also partakes of an asymmetrical
structure. Essentially, Levinas asks us to sub-
scribe to an ethical standard whose geometry
may well be living death to many or, at the
very least, a re-triggering of past trauma.
If spacing and distance are antithetical to the
face, which veils the trauma of the ﬁrst opening
of the mouth with the ﬁgure of the beloved, then
the face is never alive to the temporality of its
beholders, to the concrete material speciﬁcities
of subjects whose degrees of responsibility
must differ according to the positions they
occupy in space and time relative to the face.
In the ﬁgure of the beloved, whom one caresses
in a gesture that “carries beyond phenomenal-
ity” (Derrida, Touching 77), Levinas does not
merely obviate the hegemony of temporality,
he subverts the order of the face itself (79).
The beloved is the repressed other of the face,
the spectral residue of the traumatic encounter
with the enigmatic signiﬁer of the breast that
gestures to the anxiety of spacing and tempor-
ality – to the anxiety of being in the world, of
death that ends being. In an ethical sense, the
impulse to dispense with “the order of power,
of knowledge, of temporality” (ibid.) is not
unwelcome, since, as Irigaray notes, any
encounter between self and other “along a
path which is solely phenomenal is not enough
to establish an ethical relationship between us”
(Irigaray 46). For Irigaray, the phenomenal, on
its own, too easily sediments into the narcissism
of introjection. Consequently, this impulse
undoes itself in the very ﬁgure of the beloved,
whose non-reciprocity to the subject and to the
face invites a descent into an “economy of sen-
sation” in which “feeling always wants to grow
in intensity and continues along this path until
death due to the lack of any controls” (41).
The injunction against violation that Levinas
conceives as the supreme instant of ethical
choice before the beloved shining through the
face only signiﬁes if I accede to the face as
ethical masochism,8 consigning myself to a
grossly asymmetrical relation to the other.
The Levinasian axiom, in its tacit religiosity,
has two problems: it asks all subjects, irrespec-
tive of temporality, to subscribe to an ethics
that is actually “a category of pious discourse”
(Badiou 23), and grounds that discourse in a tra-
dition that is monotheistic, Western, and trans-
parently Judeo-Christian. Levinas asserts that
“to deserve the help of God, it is necessary to
want to do what must be done without his
help,” but refuses to “get into that question theo-
logically” because for him the issue centers on
the burden of levinasian ethics
144
the human (Entre Nous 109). Shortly thereafter,
though, he tethers the question of the relation to
the other inextricably to God:
I cannot describe the relation to God without
speaking of my concern for the other [… ] In
my relation to the other, I hear the Word of
God. It is not a metaphor; it is not only
extremely important, it is literally true. I’m
not saying that the other is God, but that in
his or her Face I hear the Word of God.
(109–10)
Though Levinas insists on a distinction
between an other in whom we hear the Word of
God and an other who is God, where would the rel-
evance of such a distinction lie? What speaks to
me right through from God is itself divine, and
consequently my relationship to this other will
never be able to partake of any semblance of reci-
procity. The relationship is always unequal:
myself, an embodied ﬁnite creature, before that
which announces the holiest of holies. By invoking
responsibility to the other as that which speaks as
the Word of God, Levinas cannot help embedding
the issue in theology, leading to the possibility that
what he proposes as an ethics of difference is actu-
ally a kind of deism:
In Lev́inas’s enterprise, the ethical domi-
nance of the Other over the theoretical ontol-
ogy of the Same is entirely bound up with a
religious axiom [… ] [T]his is philosophy
[… ] annulled by theology, itself no longer
a theology [… ] but, precisely, an ethics.
(Badiou 22–23)
The concept of non-reciprocity in the formu-
lation of the divine is the purview of a monothe-
ism in which God “holds me in his gaze and in
his hand while remaining inaccessible to me”
(Derrida, Gift 31). God asks me to keep the
secret of his interiority in me, he sees me
without my being able to return the gaze, and
what he asks of me is the absolute non-recipro-
cal act of total devotion to God, in secret. But
this non-reciprocal relation is a speciﬁcally
Western construction, Derrida notes, born out
of a historical process of incorporation in
which older mysteries (the demonic and the
platonic)9 are subsumed to the Judeo-Christian
conception of God as absolute atemporal
interiority within me, God as the one who sees
without being seen. As the basis for Levinas’s
ethical standard, non-reciprocity disqualiﬁes
itself out of hand because of its unacknowledged
historical and cultural speciﬁcity, which
problematizes this ethic as a universal standard.
Utilizing the face as ethic without gesturing
to the material historical circumstances that
gave rise to it as an ethical formulation is only
the work of neocolonialism reborn, traduced
into the liberal discourse that Badiou correctly
critiques for its tacit distinction between the
(white Western) subjects who act and the
(non-white) victims who are acted upon. In
this mode, the West can invoke the face
(indeed, has already invoked the face) to
justify every self-serving imperialist venture
under the cloak of responding to the suffering
of the other.10 Additionally, the imperative
towards ethical non-reciprocity is too akin to
the “commandment of faithfulness” in awaiting
“a revelation from the very God who was silent
at Auschwitz” (Levinas, Entre Nous 99); its
address parallels “[t]he dissymmetry of the
gaze, this disproportion that relates me, and
whatever concerns me, to a gaze that I don’t
see and that remains secret from me although
it commands me” (Derrida, Gift 27). You, the
Holocaust survivor, must overcome the disap-
pearance of God at Auschwitz, to retain your
faith in God who exposed you to unimaginable
suffering, only because the thought of renoun-
cing God is too much for those of us who did
not experience Auschwitz. Furthermore, you
must be responsible for the crimes of others,
even those who inﬂicted violence upon you or
those you loved, because the other demands
your absolute engagement with ethical responsi-
bility, irrespective of the particulars of your own
existence. This proposed asymmetry of obli-
gation is unbearable in the intensity of its
restaging of trauma. We could, of course,
reduce that subject’s responsibility, claiming
that Levinas of all people would not have
demanded such an obligation from a Holocaust
survivor. However, it is precisely the inadmissi-
bility of the temporally speciﬁc example that
undermines the face as a tenable ethical
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principle. If the survivor of Nazi violence is
exempt, what of Afghanistan? Libya? Iraq?
The Sudan? How many exemptions can an
ethical standard support before it loses privilege
as a standard?
I have argued that the Laplanchian breast at
which the infant is exposed to the enigmatic sig-
niﬁer of the other’s desire becomes the locus of
an excessive demand in Levinasian thought, a
demand whose unbearable weight for the infant
resurfaces as the unbearable ethical task of the
adult: because the breast asks too much, the
face of the other will always already ask too
much. Essentially, the impinging breast overde-
termines the response of the adult, who compul-
sively shrouds the ﬁgure of absolute vulnerability
(the beloved) with an ethical prohibition against
violence (the face), concealing a pathological
anxiety that might precipitate the subject into
either perpetrating violence on others (sadism)
or an unhealthy and all-consuming guilt over
the endless obligation to the other (masochism).
I have also characterized an inattentiveness to
temporality – to spacing and distance – as the
means by which Levinas can formulate a notion
of ethical responsibility that makes no reference
to its historical and cultural speciﬁcity and to
its essential identity as a “pious discourse”
(Badiou 23) of non-reciprocal obligation to a
thinly-veiled God (the other). By subsuming
individuated experience to endless responsibility
to the face, we compound the inﬂiction of phys-
ical violence with epistemic violence on those
for whom justice is not an impartial adjudicator
of responsibility but rather a colluding agent in
their oppression. For these subjects, refusing
persecution and endless responsi-
bility might well be the crucial
ﬁrst step in challenging the very
judicial system that exiles them
from the discourse of Levinasian
ethics.
notes
1 This tendency, interestingly enough, is part of
what Levinas himself, in “Hermeneutics and the
Beyond” (1977), finds objectionable in Edmund
Husserl’s definition of presence. At that time,
Levinas is clearly wary of a conscious subject that
“already allows itself to be forgotten for the
benefit of present entities” (Entre Nous 67).
2 Is it possible that isolation contains the
attraction towards violence, the probability that
no one is watching in this isolated space of
(almost-)profanation? No one will see, interfere,
or bear witness.
3 To whom is Levinas writing, if not to a self-
identified heterosexual masculine subject for
whom this impossible transaction with the
beloved represents an otherwise impermissible
fantasy of violation without consequence? It is as
if Levinas himself is seduced by the very transgres-
sion he describes.
4 We find the same opposition to psychoanalysis
in Levinas’s claim that he “has never been a Freu-
dian” (Entre Nous 113).
5 Though he is careful to level the affective register
by substituting “caregiver” for “mother,”
Laplanche elides the question of why every
gesture, caress, or act of “impingement” on the
infant necessarily carries the same weight and/or
valence. Why are all things equally persecutory
to the infant? Can we really conflate the incidental
or passing touch of various caregivers with the
process of providing nourishment to the infant,
which likely takes place before all other examples
of care? How can the affective magnitude of
breast-feeding and other forms of care be the
same? Regrettably, a full analysis of the problematic
of Laplanche’s position is beyond the scope of this
article.
6 Laplanche is also guilty in his turn of situating us
at a specific time and place – the infant before the
mother’s breast – without sufficiently accounting
for the temporal specificity of that encounter.
Because the infant, the subject-to-be, lacks motor
skills, language, and cognitive understanding, the
mother cannot impinge on him out of sight, or
beyond the range of his perception, except as
absence: in either case, the space occupied by the
infant in relation to the mother is vital in determin-
ing the event horizon of the adult’s impingement on
the child. Any act of caregiving demands a certain
relational distance: the infant must be able to see,
hear, or touch the adult who will subsequently gen-
erate the excessiveness of alien desire. As Irigaray
notes, “[y]our appearance to me creates a distance,
a perspective which maintains the two” (46).
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Nothing occurs without spacing as a determining
factor.
7 Extending Nancy’s argument, Derrida asks:
What if the work of mourning, philosophy
perhaps, philosophy precisely, far from only
dealing with “keeping at a distance the incor-
poration of the dead,” were, by way of this,
working on such an incorporation, on a
denying avoidance, by way of the incorpor-
ation of the dead? (Touching 52–53)
This seems to me part of the issue at stake for
Levinas: the attempt to incorporate death into an
ethical posture of mourning whose denial of
spacing and temporality (“by way of” the face and
the beloved) constitutes a “denying avoidance” of
death proper.
8 Irigaray offers another insight when she notes
that “the sadist and the masochist play with
death” (41). As an example of the two poles of
the Levinasian ethic, the sadist, in his profanation,
and the masochist, in his self-flagellating responsi-
bility for everyone else at all times, are quite suit-
able figures for my argument. What unites them
is the excessive magnitude of their desires: what
exceeds containment in both material and affective
terms.
9 The demonic or orgiastic mystery “is originally
defined as irresponsibility,” residing in “a space in
which there has not yet resounded the injunction
to respond” (Derrida, Gift 3). Though platonic
responsibility “breaks with orgiastic mystery,” Pla-
tonism still contains a certain “demonic mystery”
(7). Finally, the Christian mysterium tremendum
(trembling mystery) incorporates or represses
both the older traditions by asking the Christian
subject to keep the secret of their sublation. As
Derrida notes, “[r]epression doesn’t destroy, it
displaces something from one place to another
within the system” (8).
10 Badiou also points out the frequency with
which the Holocaust and the phenomenon of
Nazi Germany are invoked as the “absolute form
of Evil,” yet are constantly “used to schematize
every circumstance in which one wants to
produce, among opinions, an effect of the aware-
ness of Evil” (62–63). A historical atrocity passes
into the register of radical atemporality, from
where it can now signify as an unquestionable
first example of Evil’s primacy. This sort of
erasure uncomfortably parallels Levinas’s own
work, which is bound up with the need to frame
the Holocaust as “the paradigm of gratuitous
human suffering, in which evil appears in its diabo-
lical horror” (Levinas, Entre Nous 97).
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